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Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote that “[a] mob is a society of bodies
voluntarily bereaving themselves of reason and traversing its work. The mob is
man voluntarily descending to the nature of the beast.” 1 Emerson’s words echo
a common view of the inherent inefficiencies of tasking groups with generating
innovative solutions to complex problems. Such a view is premised on the idea
that the group will inevitably suppress effect on its wisest member, or, at best,
will cause the wisest member to reach his solution in a much more inefficient
manner than if that member had simply been asked to solve the problem alone.
What if, however, the group was not inferior to the individual because it was a
group, but simply because it was not effectively designed to capitalize on the
expertise of each individual member? What if such a group could be redesigned
so that the solution it produced was superior to any solution that any individual
member could generate alone? Recent research indicates that groups can indeed
produce superior solutions if they are designed to function as “wise crowds.” 2
Not all crowds are wise, but data repeatedly shows that solutions generated by a
crowd meeting the criteria of a wise crowd are much more likely to be correct
than the solutions produced by other decision-making mechanisms. 3
Although crowd wisdom is often applied to corporate organizations, it can
also be applied to policy choices in democratic societies. 4 Admittedly, crowd
wisdom is not as naturally applicable to policy decisions because one choice is
not always quantifiably superior to another choice. Nevertheless, even if
1. R. W. EMERSON, Compensation, in ESSAYS 75, 98 (Boston, James Munroe & Co. 1841).
2. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 270 (2004) (“Choosing candidates
and making policy in a democracy are not . . . cognition problems and so we should not expect
them to yield themselves to the wisdom of the crowd.”).
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id. at 270 (“There’s no reason to believe that crowds would be wise in most situations but
suddenly become doltish in the political arena.”).
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demonstrating the superiority of one policy choice is difficult, there is no reason
to think that removing policy choices from the democratic process produces
worse outcomes. 5 Trying to make policy choices with a mechanism designed to
harness crowd wisdom has the potential to provide greater decisional advantages
than the standard democratic process, to the extent that certain policy choices
are subject to quantifiable, outcome-based comparisons.
One logical policy area in which to apply crowd wisdom is educational policy,
which currently exhibits a host of competing ideas for the best mechanism to
improve student outcomes. These competing ideas can be seen in the wide
variety of schools that compete for resources to implement their approaches.
Public schools, charter schools, magnet schools, International Baccalaureate
programs, secular private schools, religious private schools, home schooling,
and other models all offer unique approaches to education. Even within these
types of schools, different educational teaching philosophies abound. Although
some schools unquestionably achieve better outcomes for their students than
others, educational policy analysts do not agree on the best method by which to
measure the quality of any particular school because of the many factors
involved in educating students. 6 In other words, some schools are likely better
than others, but separating strong schools from weak schools is difficult.
Employing crowd wisdom may provide a better solution to this problem.
Because there are so many competing educational models and so many variables
that influence the success of educational programs, the information needed to
determine which programs work for which communities is likely spread over a
5. See id.
6. Theresa Perry, The Historical and Contemporary Foundations for Robert Moses’s Call
to Make Quality Education a Constitutionally Guaranteed Right, in QUALITY EDUCATION AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT vii, xi (Theresa Perry et al. eds., 2010) (“We don’t have an agreement of
what constitutes quality education, nor does there seem to be a clear pathway to a constitutional
amendment guaranteeing quality education.”). For example, the amount of money spent on
education is likely an imperfect proxy for measuring educational quality because
low-spending states have a disproportionate share of poor, minority, and LEP children
whose educational needs are only roughly taken into account by applying pupil weights
to spending data. Student demographics, parental education and income, and other
aspects of family background undoubtedly play a role in explaining performance
disparities across states. Moreover, states vary in how they spend education funds, in
their degree of intrastate finance equity, in the standards they set for teachers and
students, and in the policy and regulatory environment they establish for schools and
districts on matters ranging from collective bargaining to assessments and accountability.
All of these factors likely bear on the efficacy of education spending and complicate the
relationship between resources and results.
Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2077–78
& n.116 (2006) (citing several studies and articles that comment on the relationship between
resources and student outcomes). Although the relationship between resources and outcomes is
imperfect, devoting increased resources to schools that rank in the lower margins of educational
outcomes would likely have a positive effect. See id. at 2078–82. The complicated host of factors
driving differences in educational outcomes likely explains disparities both among different states
and within states themselves.
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diverse population. In addition, despite the disagreement about what constitutes
educational quality, success can be measured with test scores, college
placement, and lifetime earnings. Accordingly, although educational quality is,
in many respects, the type of difficult policy choice that may not benefit from
crowd wisdom as much as a decision with a clear solution, many measures of
educational success are quantifiable and educational quality policy can benefit
from crowd wisdom principles.
In order to apply crowd wisdom to educational policy choices, a mechanism
must be in place to harness crowd wisdom and use it to improve educational
quality. The most common mechanism used to channel crowd wisdom in the
United States is the democratic process. However, this is an imperfect method
of applying crowd wisdom to policy choices because it is difficult to reflect the
many competing solutions to a policy problem on a ballot. 7 Although one
obvious solution is simply to empower the electorate to make more policy on a
referendum basis, it is not ideal because mobilizing the voting apparatus for an
election is inherently costly and time consuming, thus preventing innovative
ideas from quickly emerging and testing themselves in the policy marketplace.
Rather, a more responsive mechanism to harness crowd wisdom exists, in the
form of tax incentives.
This Article proposes that tax incentives are an effective way of channeling
crowd wisdom to improve educational quality. Specifically, the Article focuses
on a new type of tax incentive with which several states have experimented: tax
credits for contributions to organizations that fund scholarships and innovative
educational programs. Part I discusses the defining characteristics of a wise
crowd. Part II then explains why tax credits are the best mechanism for applying
crowd wisdom to educational policy decisions. Next, Part III considers school
scholarship tax credit programs and illustrates how they can be most effectively
used to create an appropriate mechanism for harnessing crowd wisdom. Finally,
the Article concludes that school scholarship tax credit programs should be
expanded in a modified form because they are an effective mechanism for
harnessing crowd wisdom and provide many of the benefits inherent in other
school choice programs without as much controversy.
I. ACHIEVING CROWD WISDOM RATHER THAN MOB MENTALITY: THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF A WISE CROWD
Before proposing a mechanism through which crowd wisdom and state tax
credits will improve educational quality, it is necessary to define the conditions
in which a crowd-based decision is superior to an individualized or centralized
decision. Simply tasking a crowd—rather than an individual—with making a

7. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 393 (1998) (noting that
referendums are effective in determining whether the electorate affirmatively or negatively favored
a particular proposition, but are not effective in determining how a particular policy choice should
be implemented).
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decision does not guarantee a superior result; in fact, a crowd could produce a
vastly inferior result. 8 For a crowd to qualify as a wise crowd, it must possess
four characteristics: (1) diversity of opinion based on individual members’
private information; (2) independence, in that each member of the crowd must
be able to form his judgment without influence from other crowd members;
(3) decentralization, in that crowd members must be able to specialize base their
opinions on local knowledge; and (4) aggregation, in that there must be some
mechanism for the members to reach a collective decision from their individual
judgments. 9 Crowds possessing all four of these characteristics are likely to
make better decisions than individuals 10 because, assuming the crowd is large
enough, individual errors will cancel each other out in the decision-making
process. 11 Fleshing out the requirements of each of these four characteristics is
helpful to understand how a wise crowd is formed.
A. Diversity
A wise crowd requires diversity, “not in a sociological sense, but rather in a
conceptual and cognitive sense.” 12 The best form of crowd diversity occurs on
multiple levels: a diverse group of ideas, a diverse group of decision-makers to
choose among those ideas, and a diverse group of funding sources for those
ideas. 13 Although this type of diversity does not guarantee that every idea will
be successful, it does create an environment in which successful ideas are more
likely to emerge and that unsuccessful ideas are removed from the marketplace
relatively quickly. 14 Of course, this type of diversity is much easier to achieve
in large groups. 15 A critical component of crowd diversity is that the members
of the group must possess some level of information relevant to making a good
decision, although each member need not have the same amount of
information. 16 Indeed, if the members of a group do have varying degrees of

8. SUROWIECKI, supra note 2, at xix.
9. Id. at 10.
10. A superior decision is not guaranteed one hundred percent of the time; rather, it is simply
more likely that a wise crowd will make a decision superior to that of an individual. See id. at
34–35.
11. Id. at 10. Once the errors have been cancelled out, only the crowd’s collective information
remains. Id. However, “even with the errors canceled out, it’s possible that a group’s judgment
will be bad. For the group to be smart, there has to be at least some information in the ‘information’
part of the ‘information minus error’ equation.” Id.
12. Id. at 28.
13. See id. When such diversity exists, “the chances that at least someone will take a gamble
on a radical or unlikely idea obviously increases.” Id.
14. See id. at 28–29.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 31. Although choosing group members who possess at least some degree of useful
information is ideal for a wise crowd, determining exactly who should be in a particular group is
so difficult that it is generally better to simply select the group randomly; spending time trying to
determine precisely who should be in the group usually is a wasted effort. See id. at 276.
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information, this group should produce better results than two individuals with
high intelligence and large amounts of information. 17 Finally, it is beneficial if
there is an incentive system in place to encourage group members to focus on
achieving the best outcomes. 18
B. Independence
In order for the group to be wise, the members must also have the ability to
make individual evaluations as free as possible from the influence of the other
group members. 19 Independence is necessary because “[t]he more influence we
exert on each other, the more likely it is that we will believe the same things and
make the same mistakes.” 20 The most effective way to achieve independence in
a group is to require the members make decisions simultaneously, or as close to
simultaneously as possible, rather than in sequence. 21
C. Decentralization
The third essential characteristic to a wise crowd is decentralization, which,
combined with specialization, maximizes the benefits of different, informed
points of view. 22 Decentralization is critical to harnessing group members’
innate knowledge that cannot easily be communicated to other members. 23 This
tacit, specialized knowledge is critical because the individuals closest to a
problem likely possess superior knowledge for solving the problem than a
centralized authority. 24 Decentralization indicates that crowd wisdom is most
effective if an organization or entity allows local problems to be addressed at the
local level rather than at a centralized level. 25 This can produce an overall more
effective organization that embodies the sum of these individualized solutions,
as opposed to top-down solutions imposed throughout the organization. 26
Although decentralization fosters an environment in which specialists can
apply their unique, independent perspectives toward solving a problem, it is not

17. See id. at 31.
18. See id. at 20. Interestingly, these incentives do not necessarily need to be financial nor do
they necessarily need to be large in order to achieve the desired effect. Id. at 279–80. Determining
the appropriate incentive level can nevertheless be difficult so that the incentive does not distort
behavior towards an solution away from the ideal one. Id. at 280.
19. Id. at 42–43.
20. Id. at 42. When independence breaks down, a group may “become individually smarter
but collectively dumber.” Id.
21. Id. at 64.
22. See id. at 71 (explaining that specialization “increases the scope and the diversity of the
opinions and information in the system”).
23. Id.
24. Id. (noting that the concept of decentralization and its benefit to problem solving dates
back to ancient Athens).
25. See id. at 211–12.
26. See id. at 212.
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particularly efficient. 27 Without some process to aggregate the group members’
various solutions, there is a risk that valuable information will not be
disseminated to or valued by the rest of the group. 28 A decentralization system
without a mechanism to mitigate this inefficiency will not necessarily be more
advantageous than a centralized one. 29
D. Aggregation
In order to address the inefficiencies inherent to a decentralized system, a wise
crowd requires a centralizing mechanism to aggregate the individual judgments
of the group into a final decision. 30 Without aggregation, a group that satisfies
the first three conditions of a wise crowd may achieve the solution proposed by
the smartest, best-informed member of the group, but that result is not certain. 31
However, with an aggregating mechanism in place, the group’s collective
solution is more likely to be superior to even the smartest individual group
member’s solution. 32
II. HARNESSING THE CROWD TO IMPROVE EDUCATION: BALLOTS, VOUCHERS,
DEDUCTIONS, OR TAX CREDITS?
If crowd wisdom is to be applied to educational policy choices, there are
several competing mechanisms that could be employed to harness it. The
simplest choice is to subject policy options to the democratic voting process. In
the alternative, crowd wisdom could be channeled by allowing the crowd to
direct public funding to different educational programs through the use of
voucher systems or tax incentives. The use of tax incentives, specifically tax
credits, is the best mechanism by which to satisfy the requirements of a wise
crowd.
A. Tax Incentives Are a Better Mechanism for Harnessing Crowd Wisdom
Than Ballot-Based Voting
If harnessing crowd wisdom requires discerning the preferences of an
electorate, it is tempting to accomplish this by transferring policy choices from
government officials to the public through the referendum process. However,
succumbing to this temptation ignores a mechanism that can better accomplish
this goal. Tax incentives, described as using “taxes as ballots,” can be much
more effective than ballot-based voting in channeling the electorate’s various

27. See id. at 72–73.
28. Id. at 71–72.
29. See id. at 74 (“[A] decentralized system can only produce genuinely intelligent results if
there’s a means of aggregating the information of everyone in the system.”).
30. See id. at 74–75.
31. Id. at 75.
32. Id.
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policy preferences. 33 Tax incentives are not necessarily a viable option for
determining policy in areas in which legislatures are highly unlikely to cede their
authority to the public. 34 However, in areas in which citizens have better
information than the government, incentivizing citizens to express their
individual preferences through tax incentives rather than through a ballot
initiative increases the likelihood that parties with superior information allocate
funding toward preferential policy outcomes. 35
In the policy areas that benefit more from local knowledge, a properly
structured tax incentive also has the benefit of better satisfying the requirements
of a wise crowd. Such a tax incentive enhances diversity because many different
organizations can compete for taxpayer contributions, thus expanding the range
of available policy options. 36 In addition, tax incentives can strengthen
decentralization if they are tailored to incentivize taxpayers to express their
policy preferences at the regional level. 37 Tax incentives can also serve as an
aggregating mechanism if they are structured to incentivize contributions to
organizations that can help centralize taxpayer preferences.
Admittedly, tax incentives, if structured incorrectly, could also make a crowd
less wise. Diversity could suffer if only certain taxpayers are able to take
advantage of the tax incentive. For example, taxpayers who do not itemize their
deductions are not eligible to take a charitable deduction and thus are
discouraged from using the tax incentive. 38 In addition, if a tax incentive is
structured to give a greater incentive to taxpayers with more resources, any
33. Levmore, supra note 7, at 387–89 (analyzing the benefits of tax incentives as a vehicle
for democratizing policy choices in the specific context of charitable deductions).
34. Id. at 427 (“[I]t would be startling to find direct democracy of any kind with respect to the
question of where to build new military bases, when to offer exemptions from antitrust law, or the
extent to which patent and copyright monopolies ought to be extended.”).
35. Id. at 427–28. For example:
Voters across the country are unlikely to be well informed about my local hospital or
your university, so a conventional exercise in direct democracy would not delegate
decisionmaking to better informed parties. However, alumni of your university and
citizens of my local community might be fairly well informed about their respective
organizations.
Id.
36. Tax incentives also better satisfy the independence prong. Taxpayers have much less
information about other taxpayers’ use of tax incentives than they do about other voters’ voting
preferences because the media does not regularly release polling data about tax incentives. Without
this data, taxpayers are free to exercise their own independent judgment. Although the increase in
independence is likely not as significant as the increase in diversity, improvements on independence
could nevertheless contribute to making the crowd wiser.
37. See Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 562 (2008) (noting that
the decision to make a charitable contribution, which makes the taxpayer eligible for a tax incentive,
may depend on where the taxpayer lives).
38. Id. (“[T]axpayers who do not itemize their deductions at all because the standard
deduction exceeds the total value of the deductions they could itemize effectively have no ‘vote’
over the use of government resources. Their gifts to charity generate no rebate at all from the
government.”).
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advantages may be counteracted by the corresponding decrease in the overall
size of the pool of decision-makers. This would negate the benefits of having a
highly diverse crowd that possesses degrees of information to make decisions. 39
However, properly structuring the tax incentive to reach as many taxpayers as
possible addresses many of these concerns.
B. Tax Incentives Are a Better Mechanism for Harnessing Crowd Wisdom
Than Vouchers and Correct Inherent Problems That Have Made Voucher
Systems Controversial
Tax incentives are also a better mechanism for generating diverse approaches
to education. Voucher systems operate by using public money to give students
the choice of attending a private school instead of a public school. Proponents
of voucher systems tout them as a way of improving education by increasing
competitiveness between public and private schools. 40 Critics argue that these
systems actually accomplish the opposite by weakening the public school
system—because vouchers shift funds and high-achieving students into private
schools—and by creating a system in which students become trapped in
deteriorating public school systems that do not have a realistic chance of
improvement. 41 Furthermore, critics point out that the private schools that
receive voucher-supported students are primarily religious, which causes a
transfer of public funds for religious education and potentially violates the
Establishment Clause. 42 Even voucher programs that are tailored to pass
constitutional scrutiny are problematic 43 because state Blaine Amendments
39. But see Levmore, supra note 7, at 406 (arguing that objections to harnessing voter
preferences regarding charitable deductions through tax incentives “may be overcome for some by
the substantial ‘voter turnout’ that is induced by the tax deduction scheme, and by the fact that the
government may need all the help it can get in monitoring and choosing among hospitals, schools,
social welfare agencies, and the like”).
40. Jonathan D. Boyer, Education Tax Credits: School Choice Initiatives Capable of
Surmounting Blaine Amendments, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 120 (2009) (noting that
proponents also argue that voucher programs promote consumer choice and enhance parents’ rights
to determine the best way to educate their children).
41. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, State Tax Credits for Private Education: The
Arizona Experience in Kotterman v. Killian, 136 EDUC. L. REP. 647, 654–55, 659–60 (1999); see
also Boyer, supra note 40, at 120.
42. See Boyer, supra note 40, at 120. The use of public funds is a critical component of
voucher programs because private funds alone are insufficient to fund them. Mawdsley, supra note
41, at 654–55. However, voucher programs that use public funds are subject to attack on the
grounds that they violate the Establishment Clause by advancing religion. See William G. Frey
& Virginia Lynn Hogben, Vouchers, Tuition Tax Credits, and Scholarship-Donation Tax Credits:
A Constitutional and Practical Analysis, 31 STETSON L. REV. 165, 166, 168–71 (2002) (discussing
Commissioner for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon, two
companion cases that established that voucher systems do not violate the Establishment Clause if
they offer students the option to attend either public or private schools).
43. For a voucher program to have the best chance of surviving a constitutional challenge, it
must offer the same aid to both public and private school students, which can be accomplished by
providing vouchers for public school students to attend other public schools as well as private
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prevent them from becoming a national solution. 44 Blaine Amendments, which
were added to many state constitutions in the late nineteenth century to reflect
anti-Catholic sentiments, prohibit the allocation of state funds to religious
schools. 45
Tax credits and tax deductions are more likely to survive Blaine Amendment
challenges than voucher programs. 46 Unlike voucher programs, which involve
the direct transfer of public funds to religions schools, refundable tax credits and
tax deductions benefit religious schools indirectly because public money is
transferred to individual taxpayers, who have already chosen to spend their
money to fund religious schools. 47 Tax credit scholarship programs, with which
schools. See Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 177 (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence
surrounding the constitutionality of voucher programs); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private
Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 217–18 (2010) (noting that Zelmon
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–64 (2002) likely resolved this issue definitively at the
federal level by holding that religiously neutral scholarship programs were constitutionally
permissible, even if the practical effect was that most beneficiaries chose religious education).
44. See, e.g., Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 182–83; Garnett, supra note 43, at 217–18;
Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557,
577 (2008).
45. See Boyer, supra note 40, at 118; Moe, supra note 44, at 577.
46. Boyer, supra note 40, at 145–47. Similarly, tax deductions and credits generally will
survive federal Establishment Clause challenges, provided that similar deductions or credits are
provided to families of students who attend public schools. Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at
183–84 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–403 (1983)) (“This different treatment of tax
deductions is consistent with basic Establishment Clause principles because a true tax deduction or
credit reduces taxes, rather than paying out public money obtained from other taxpayers.”).
47. Boyer, supra note 40, at 146. However, this argument could theoretically be challenged
by applying tax expenditure theory to argue that these types of tax deductions or credits really do
constitute the direct expenditure of public funds. Tax expenditure theory, first proposed by
Professor Stanley Surrey, posits “that tax credits, deductions, and exemptions are similar to direct
governmental expenditures because they provide special benefits to favored individuals and result
in higher tax rates for all other individuals.” Christopher A. Bishop, Comment, Revisiting Article
I, Section 5 of the Oregon Constitution: The Application of Priest v. Pearce and an Evaluation of
the Oregon School Tax Credit, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 427, 468 (2002). The primary criticisms
of this theory are that: (1) it rests on the mistaken assumption that all property fundamentally
belongs to the government and that the government simply refrains from taking what rightfully
belongs to it when it allows a tax expenditure or deduction; (2) when the government chooses to
enact a tax deduction or credit, it is choosing to omit certain entities or transactions from the tax
base; and (3) the theory rests on the premise that there is an ideal level of taxation, departures from
which must be viewed as tax expenditures. Id. (quoting Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the
Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 996–99 (1999)).
Tax expenditure theory, if applied to Establishment Clause or Blaine Amendment challenges, could
potentially put tax deductions and credits on the same footing as vouchers, in that both would be
considered government spending. Id. at 468–69 (“While some scholars have argued that the tax
expenditure theory be applied to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, others reject this theory.
Furthermore, scholars and state courts alike have recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet
to apply this theory when interpreting the Establishment Clause.”). However, there is considerable
tension among the U.S. Supreme Court justices as to whether tax expenditure theory should be
applied to these types of cases, with a bare majority currently holding that tax credits are not the
equivalent of government expenditures. See Edward Shaoul, Comment, Arizona Christian School
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taxpayers receive credits or deductions for contributing to organizations that
then award scholarships, provide even better insulation to Blaine Amendment
challenges. 48 Public funding is separated from the religious organization by at
least two levels of decision-makers—the taxpayer and the organization that
awards the scholarships—thus making it harder to argue that the public is
directly funding the religious organization. 49
C. Credits Are a Better Mechanism for Harnessing Crowd Wisdom Than
Deductions
Once policymakers decide to attempt to harness crowd wisdom with tax
incentives, they must determine the best way to structure the incentives. This
requires them to choose between two fundamental types of tax incentives: partial
credits and deductions. 50 Although deductions and credits can often be
structured to yield the same economic results—at least with regard to taxpayers
in the same tax bracket 51—there are critical differences between the two
structures that can influence which approach is better for a particular policy goal.
Understandably, each approach has both advantages and disadvantages, and the
preferred mechanism will likely depend on the specific policy goals.
One of the most significant differences between deductions and credits is that
deductions are more valuable to taxpayers in higher tax brackets, whereas credits
have the same value to all taxpayers, regardless of their tax bracket. 52
Consequently, deductions are the better option in situations in which the goal is
to measure the income to be taxed, while credits are better used in situations in
which the primary goal is to incentivize certain behaviors because they provide
Tuition Organization v. Winn: Reconsidering Flast’s Exception to the Rule Against Taxpayer
Standing and Establishing the Tax Credit Distinction, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 305, 311 (2011).
48. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 43, at 217–18 (comparing, for example, Arizona’s school
scholarship tax credit program, which survived a constitutional challenge, and a limited voucher
program, which was invalidated on Blaine Amendment grounds). Several states have authorized
these types of tax incentives for school tuition organizations. See infra Part III.A.
49. Boyer, supra note 40, at 146–47; see also Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 186.
Furthermore,
tax credits for [school tuition organization] contributions are often designed specifically
to test this illusive boundary of indirectness, as they require a number of entities to
participate in the creation of an elaborate chain of financial exchanges. Employing such
an elaborate design presents a strong opportunity for school-choice advocates to test the
bounds of indirectness that Blaine Amendment jurisprudence is grappling with.
Boyer, supra note 40, at 146–47.
50. Full credits (as opposed to partial ones) are not as viable of a policy choice because they
create a costless mechanism of directing government funds that could cause potential recipients to
compete so aggressively for these funds that true individual preferences might be distorted or
masked. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 409–11. Attaching a cost to a vote could cause the voter
to take his vote more seriously. Id. at 411.
51. See id. at 414 (“[I]n most cases, a less-than-full credit can be offered as a perfect substitute
for a tax deduction.”).
52. Id.
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equal incentives to all taxpayers. 53 For example, the federal tax incentive to
encourage charitable donations could be structured as a deduction (because a
potential policy goal is to measure taxable income after taxpayers make
charitable contributions) or as a credit (because the potential purpose of the
incentive is to encourage charitable giving). 54 The number of taxpayers that
claim a deduction for donations to religious organizations may have tipped the
scales in favor of structuring the incentive as a deduction. 55 If a tax incentive
significantly benefits religious organizations, structuring the incentive as a
deduction rather than as a credit may help to avoid constitutional challenges by
allowing the government to argue that it is simply measuring taxable income
rather than directly incentivizing contributions to religious organizations. 56
A significant advantage of credits—as long as they are refundable—is that
they affect a much broader tax base than deductions because many taxpayers
have no income tax liability and therefore do not benefit from deductions. 57
Indeed, tax credits are most efficient if offered at the lowest possible rate and to
the broadest possible group because the utility of consumption diminishes at
higher income levels. 58 Although increasing the tax base eligible for the
incentive could also be accomplished with an “above-the-line” deduction (for
which all tax filers are eligible) or a “below-the-line” deduction (for which only
deduction itemizers are eligible), this mechanism is still inferior to a credit for
reducing the inequitable benefits received by taxpayers based solely on their tax
bracket. 59

53. Id.; see also Jenn, supra note 37, at 570 (noting that deductions offer different incentives
for different types of taxpayers).
54. Levmore, supra note 7, at 415.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24, 28–29 (2006) (“Unlike other forms of tax incentives, a uniform
refundable credit is not related to a household’s marginal tax rate and provides cash payments to
qualifying households even if they owe no income tax.”); see also Frey & Hogben, supra note 42,
at 184; Adele Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits and Issues of Accountability and Equity,
11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 257–58 (2000). The refundable nature of the tax credit is key,
especially if the incentive is designed to serve a policy goal in which taxpayers with little to no tax
liability are significantly interested beneficiaries or contributors. Batchelder et al., supra, at 54; see
also Jenn, supra note 37, at 571.
58. Jenn, supra note 37, at 574.
59. See id. at 572. Horizontal equity—the equitable norm requiring similar treatment for
similarly situated individuals—is a significant concern because a weakening of horizontal equity
can have negative effects on taxpayer morale. See id. at 563. Interestingly, deductions provide
incentives not only to taxpayers at different income levels, but also to taxpayers located in different
geographic locations because certain regions have higher itemization rates than others. See id. at
571–72.
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Additionally, refundable credits structure tax incentives in a more
economically efficient manner than deductions. 60 However, these advantages
rest on the assumption that taxpayer responsiveness to tax incentives does not
vary based on income level. 61 If this assumption is incorrect, deductions may
be a more efficient incentive mechanism because they can easily be structured
to create different incentives across income ranges. 62 Furthermore, providing
differential incentives through deductions could theoretically promote economic
efficiency because taxpayers with higher incomes produce greater positive
externalities by engaging in the incentivized behavior. 63 This argument justifies
structuring the tax incentive for charitable donations as a deduction rather than
as a credit, thereby creating greater incentive for high-income taxpayers to make
charitable donations than for lower-income taxpayers. 64 Because it is nearly
impossible to measure where and how such systematic variations
occur—assuming that they occur at all—the potential efficiency benefits of
deductions remain largely theoretical. 65 Therefore, credits remain the more
practical choice for maximizing efficiency.

60. Batchelder et al., supra note 57, at 47–49 (arguing that “uniform refundable credits are
generally the most efficient way to structure individual income tax incentives” because these credits
minimize economic deadweight loss by reducing the number of large errors that occur in favor of
a higher frequency of smaller errors); see also Jenn, supra note 37, at 574 (“A tax incentive that
applies uniformly across taxpayers of all different statuses has the further efficiency advantage that
it generally minimizes the expected error in the application of the incentive.”); Deborah M. Weiss,
Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1949, 1973–74 (1994) (explaining that tax law
prefers credits to deductions “primarily in those provisions that are social welfare measures rather
than tax incentives”). However, credits complicate the tax code and “can undermine fairness in the
distribution of tax burdens.” Robinson, supra note 57, at 254, 258–59. Deductions could at least
theoretically improve efficiency by reducing individual marginal tax rates and, therefore, the
deadweight cost of taxation. However, because current marginal tax rates are lower and flatter than
they have been in the past, it is unclear if deductions actually generate these potential efficiency
benefits. Jenn, supra note 37, at 569.
61. See Batchelder et al., supra note 57, at 27–28 & n.16; Jenn, supra note 37, at 575.
62. Batchelder et al., supra note 57, at 27–28 & n.16; Jenn, supra note 37, at 575–76. Of
course, for those differential incentives to function as intended, taxpayers must be aware of their
marginal tax rate, which is far from guaranteed. Jenn, supra note 37, at 580.
63. Jenn, supra note 37, at 576.
64. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 427–28 (“Some large contributors will be especially well
informed, as members of governing boards, or simply because they investigate before
‘investing.’”). But see Jenn, supra note 37, at 562 (arguing that the charitable deduction is
fundamentally undemocratic because it gives undue influence to taxpayers in higher tax brackets
solely because they have higher incomes). Deductions may also be inequitable because each dollar
contributed by a taxpayer in a higher tax bracket directs a larger share of government resources
than a dollar contributed by a taxpayer in a lower tax bracket. Id.
65. See Jenn, supra note 37, at 576–77 (“Ultimately, to presume that a tax incentive could be
tailored to follow the contours of income-based variations in behavioral responses would seem to
be an exercise in technocratic hubris.”).
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III. DESIGNING AN EDUCATIONAL TAX CREDIT TO HARNESS CROWD WISDOM
Having concluded that tax incentives are preferable to vouchers and that tax
credits are generally preferable to deductions, the next step is to determine how
a tax credit should be structured to benefit from crowd wisdom. Several states
have implemented educational tax credit programs that serve as helpful
examples in the attempt to structure such a credit. 66 Although these programs
differ from state to state, most of the programs provide credits to taxpayers for
contributions made to school scholarship organizations. These organizations
then award money to students to assist them in attending private schools, thereby
providing greater insulation from Establishment Clause and Blaine Amendment
challenges than other forms of educational tax incentives and vouchers. 67 This
enhanced protection from state and federal constitutional challenges allows
school scholarship organization tax credit programs to be much more flexible in
their design than voucher programs. 68 For example, to prevent claims of
religious discrimination, some voucher programs require private schools to
accept students without regard to admissions standards. 69 School scholarship
organization tax credits programs do not impose this type of restriction, which

66. The Friedman Foundation maintains a summary of scholarship tuition organization
related legislation on its website. See School Choice Programs, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC.
CHOICE, www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-programs.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2014).
67. See supra Part II.B. (discussing why tax incentives generally are superior to vouchers for
withstanding Establishment Clause and Blaine Amendment challenges); see also supra notes
48–49 and accompanying text (discussing why school scholarship tax credits stand on firmer state
and federal constitutional grounds than even other educational tax incentives).
School scholarship organization credits are also be on stronger footing with respect to state
education clause and tax uniformity constitutional challenges. See Garnett, supra note 43, at
218–19 (quoting Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2006)) (noting that the Florida Supreme
Court held that a state voucher program violated the Florida’s education clause, which required the
state to maintain a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of public education”);
see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Winn for Educational Pluralism, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 31,
33–36 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/a-winn
-for-educational-pluralism/ (pointing out that Arizona upheld a similar tax credit program).
Finally, school scholarship organization credits do not exacerbate horizontal tax inequity or
economic inefficiency as significantly as direct credits or deductions, which treat taxpayers with
similar income levels differently solely based on their decision to send their children to private
schools. Robinson, supra note 57, at 258. School scholarship organization credits avoid this
problem because the different treatment is based on the taxpayer’s decision to contribute to a school
scholarship organization without regard to whether the taxpayer actually chose to enroll a child in
a private school. Furthermore, school scholarship organizations are more economically efficient
because they are less likely to incentivize behavior that the taxpayer is already undertaking,
regardless of the potential tax benefit. But see Vada Waters Lindsey, The Vulnerability of Using
Tax Incentives in Wisconsin, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 107, 113 (2004) (arguing that school scholarship
credits can still weaken both horizontal and vertical equity).
68. Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 186–87.
69. Id.
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encourages schools with more rigorous admissions criteria to participate. 70 As
a result, school scholarship organization tax credits better harness crowd wisdom
by ensuring that a diverse group of schools participates in the program.
A. Overview of School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs
1. Alabama
Beginning with tax year 2013, Alabama offers a tax credit for contributions
made during the tax year to school scholarship granting organizations. 71 The
credit is limited to no more than the lesser of fifty percent of the taxpayer’s tax
liability or $7,500 per individual taxpayer or married couple filing jointly. 72
Corporate taxpayers may also claim a credit up to fifty percent of their tax
liability for the year. 73 The state caps the total amount of credits it issues at $25
million. 74 Unused credits can be carried forward for three years. 75 Scholarship
granting organizations then make awards to qualifying low-income and
middle-class public school students to assist them in attending either a private
school or another public school that is performing at a higher level than the
student’s current school. 76 Donations to scholarship granting organizations
cannot be earmarked for particular students. 77
2. Arizona
Arizona provides a tax credit (initially $500 for individuals and $1,000 for
married couples filing jointly), adjusted for inflation, as well as an additional
supplementary credit under its “switcher” program, for contributions to school
tuition organizations. 78 Any remaining balance of the credit can be carried
forward for five years if the taxpayer does not use it within the taxable year in
70. Id.
71. ALA. CODE § 16-6D-9(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). Alabama also provides an
individual tax credit directly to parents to fund moving their children from failing public schools to
either non-failing public schools or private schools. Id. § 16-6D-8(a)(1).
72. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(2).
73. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(3).
74. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(3).
75. Id. § 16-6D-9(a)(4).
76. Id. § 16-6D-4.
77. Id. § 16-6D-9(b)(1)(n).
78. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2006 & Supp. 2012); id. § 43-1089.03 (Supp. 2012).
In 2014, the caps were $528 for individuals and $1,056 for married taxpayers filing jointly. Arizona
– Original Individual Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC.
CHOICE,
http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/Personal-Tax-Credits-for-School
-Tuition-Organizations.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). In 2014, the caps for the supplementary
“switcher” credit were $525 for individuals and $1050 for married taxpayers filing jointly, although
the taxpayers may not use the “switcher” credits until they exceed the caps under the original credit.
Arizona – “Switcher” Individual Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR
EDUC. Choice, http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/-Switcher--Individual-Income
-Tax-Credit-Scholarship-Program.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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which he made the contribution. 79 The taxpayer cannot designate the donation
for his own benefit, the benefit of a dependent, or the benefit of a specific
student. 80 Similarly, school tuition organizations cannot limit scholarships to
recipients at only one school. 81
Corporate taxpayers may also be eligible for income and premium tax credits
for contributions to school tuition organizations. 82 Although many of the
limitations on corporate tax credits are similar to the limitations on individual
tax credits, 83 corporate credits are limited primarily at the aggregate level. 84
Specifically, they are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, with an
aggregate limitation initially of $10 million (increased twenty percent per year
beginning in 2007) for donations to school tuition organizations serving
traditional schools and $5 million for donations to school tuition organizations
serving schools for the disabled or the displaced. 85
3. Florida
Florida grants a credit against a variety of taxes for contributions to eligible
scholarship funding organizations. 86 Although the credits are generally one
hundred percent tax credits, Florida imposes specific limitations on the
calculation and amount of the credit, depending on the type of tax that is being
credited. 87 The credit is distributed on a first-come, first-served basis is capped
state-wide initially at $140 million per fiscal year, although the state will
increase the cap if the amount of the credits awarded approaches it. 88 Unused
credits can be carried over with state approval. 89
79. Id. § 43-1089(D) (Supp. 2012).
80. Id. § 43-1089(F) (Supp. 2012). Taxpayers may not circumvent this provision by entering
into agreements with other taxpayers to reciprocally designate their respective donations for the
benefit of each other’s dependents. Id. However, taxpayers, are permitted to make
recommendations regarding student beneficiaries. Id. § 43-1603(B)(3) (Supp. 2012).
81. Id. § 43-1603(B)(2) (Supp. 2012).
82. See id. §§ 20-224.07 (Supp. 2012), 43-1183 (Supp. 2012), 1184 (Supp. 2012).
83. Compare id. § 20-224.07, and id. § 43-1089 (Supp. 2012), with id. § 43-1183, and id.
§ 1184.
84. Id. §§ 43-1183, 1184.
85. Id. §§ 43-1183(c), 1184(c). In 2014, the total aggregate cap was $35.8 million per year
for the low-income corporate tax credit. Arizona – Low-Income Corporate Income Tax Credit
Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, http://www.edchoice.org/School
-Choice/Programs/Corporate-Tax-Credits-for-School-Tuition-Organizations.aspx (last visited
Apr. 14, 2014).
86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.0251 (West 2011), 212.1831 (West 2011), 220.1875 (West
Supp. 2012), 561.1211 (West Supp. 2012), 624.51055 (West Supp. 2012).
87. Id. §§ 211.0251, 212.1831, 220.1875, 561.1211, 624.51055.
88. Id. § 1002.395(5) (West 2012). In 2014, the statewide cap was $286.25 million per year.
Florida – Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE,
http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/Florida-Tax-Credit-Scholarship-Program.aspx
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
89. Id. § 1002.395(5)(c).
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The scholarship funding organizations provide scholarships to students who
cannot afford private school or must attend public schools outside of their
districts or lab schools. 90 These scholarships are awarded on a first-come,
first-served basis, although students already receiving the scholarships receive
priority. 91 Scholarships cannot be restricted for use at a specific school or for
the benefit of the children of the owners or operators of scholarship funding
organizations or eligible private schools. 92 Additionally, there are limits on the
amount of money that a scholarship funding organization can award to a
particular student, which vary depending on the year, the type of scholarship,
and the student’s household income. 93
4. Georgia
Georgia allows individuals donating to student scholarship organizations to
take a credit of the lesser of $1,000 ($2,500 for married taxpayers filing jointly)
or the amount donated, but individuals who are members, shareholders, or
partners of pass-through entities can claim a credit up to $10,000 of the taxes
they pay in their capacity as members or partners. 94 Corporations receive a
credit of the lesser of seventy-five percent of their income tax liability or the
amount donated. 95 Unused portions of the credit can be carried forward for five
years. 96 Credits are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and there is an
aggregate statewide cap for the credits, originally set at $50 million and adjusted
for inflation until January 1, 2018. 97 Taxpayers claiming the credit may not
direct their donation to one of their dependents. 98 Any Georgia public school
student is eligible to receive benefits, which they must use for tuition and fees at
private schools. 99
5. Indiana
Indiana provides a credit equal to fifty percent of the amount that a taxpayer
contributes to a school scholarship granting organization. 100 Unused credits

90. Id. § 1002.395(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012), 1.002.395(6)(d) (West 2012).
91. Id. § 1002.395(6)(e)–(f) (West 2012).
92. Id. § 1002.395(6)(g) (West 2012).
93. Id. § 1002.395(12) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-29.16(b) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
95. Id. § 48-7-29.16(c) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
96. Id. § 48-7-29.16(e) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
97. Id. § 48-7-29.16(f) (2009 & Supp. 2012). For 2014, the cap was $58 million.
Georgia – Qualified Education Expense Tax Credit, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE,
http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/Programs/Private-School-Tax-Credit-for-Donations-to
-Student-Scholarship-Organizations.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
98. Id. § 48-7-29.16(d) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
99. Id. §§ 20-2A-1 (2012), 48-7-29.16(a) (2009 & Supp. 2012).
100. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3.1-30.5-7, 6-3.1-30.5-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
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cannot be carried over or refunded. 101 The total amount of tax credits that can
be awarded during the state’s fiscal year is capped statewide at $7.5 million. 102
Scholarship granting organizations make awards to students who cannot afford
private school tuition. 103 The organizations may not limit scholarship
availability to students of a single participating school. 104 Interestingly, Indiana
requires participating schools to instruct students with specific curriculum and
in national and cultural values. 105
6. Iowa
Iowa awards a tax credit of sixty-five percent of the amount of the taxpayer’s
total contribution to a school tuition organization that provides private school
tuition grants to students from low-income families. 106 Unused credits can be
carried forward for five years. 107 For spouses, part-year residents, and
nonresidents, the amount of the credit depends on the source of the income. 108
The contributing taxpayer may not direct the contribution to one of his
dependents or to any other specific student. 109 There is a statewide cap of $12
million on the total amount of credits that can be awarded. 110 The amount of tax
credit certificates that each school tuition organization can issue is based on the
number of students enrolled in participating private schools. 111
7. Louisiana
Louisiana provides a tax credit for up to the total amount of a taxpayer’s
donation to a school tuition organization, provided that the donation is actually
used to fund a private school scholarship for a qualifying student. 112 Donations
cannot be earmarked to provide scholarships for specific students or schools, but
donations can be earmarked for students with disabilities. 113 The number of
students at any one school receiving scholarships from a school tuition
organization may not exceed twenty percent of the school’s total enrollment. 114
101. Id. § 6-3.1-30.5-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
102. Id. § 6-3.10-30.5-13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
103. Id. § 20-51-3-5(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
104. Id. § 20-51-3-5(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
105. Id. § 20-51-4-1(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
106. IOWA CODE § 422.11S(1), (5) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). Iowa also provides a credit of
twenty-five percent of the first $1,000 spent for tuition or textbooks for dependents—a contribution
need not be made through a school tuition organization—as long as the tuition and textbooks are
not designed to inculcate religious belief. Id. § 422.12(1)(b), (2)(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
107. Id. § 422.11S(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
108. Id. § 422.11S(4) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
109. Id. § 422.11S(2)(b).
110. Id. § 422.11S(7) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
111. Id. § 422.11S(7)(b).
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6301(A)(1) (Supp. 2013).
113. Id. § 47:6301(A)(3) (Supp. 2013).
114. Id. § 47:6301(B)(2)(c) (Supp. 2013).
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If more eligible students apply than there are number of scholarships, the school
must use a random selection process. 115 However, certain groups, such as
siblings of enrolled students and students who are attending other private schools
on scholarship, will receive preference. 116 The program also gives first priority
to students from the poorest performing public schools. 117
8. New Hampshire
New Hampshire permits certain business entities to claim a credit against the
state’s business profits tax or business enterprise tax equal to eighty-five percent
of its contributions to a scholarship organization. 118 No business can receive
more than ten percent of the total credits awarded state-wide. 119 The business
entity may not direct its contribution to a specific student or nonpublic school. 120
There is an initial statewide cap of $3.4 million of total tax credits that can be
awarded on a first-come, first-served basis in the first year of the program,
although a mechanism exists to increase this cap after the first year of the
program. 121 Although the program reduces funding for school districts with
students receiving scholarships, the program established a stabilization grant
mechanism to ensure that school districts do not experience a significant
reduction in revenue. 122 The scholarship organizations award scholarships to
qualifying students to assist them in paying private school tuition (except in
certain special education situations) or for transportation to public schools that
are outside of the student’s district and ineligible to receive adequate education
grant payments. 123
9. Oklahoma
Oklahoma provides a credit for fifty percent of contributions made to a
scholarship granting organization or an educational improvement grant
organization, capped at $1,000 for individuals ($2,000 for married taxpayers
filing jointly) and $100,000 for corporate taxpayers. 124 The credit increases to
seventy-five percent of a contribution to an educational improvement
organization if the taxpayer commits to contributing the same amount for two

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
2012).

Id.
Id. §§ 47:6301(B)(2)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2013).
Id. § 47:6301(B)(2)(a)(iv) (Supp. 2013).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-G:3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 77-G:4(I)–(II) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012), 77-G:5(II)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
Id. §§ 77-G:7(I) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012), 77-G:8(I) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
Id. § 77-G:2(I)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.206(B)(1) (West Supp. 2012), (C)(1) (West Supp.
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consecutive years. 125 Taxpayers can carry forward unused tax credits of either
type for three years. 126
There is a statewide cap of $1,750,000 for the total amount of tax credits
awarded to individuals each year, and an additional $1,750,000 cap for tax
credits awarded to corporate taxpayers, for contributions to scholarship granting
organizations. 127 For tax credits awarded for contributions to educational
improvement grant organizations, there is a $1,500,000 statewide cap for all
taxpayers. 128 If it appears that the caps will be exceeded, the state Tax
Commission will establish proportionate shares of the credits so that the total
amount of credits awarded stay within the statewide caps. 129 If one of the tax
credit pools has not been exhausted, the remaining funds can be added to another
tax credit pool that has been exhausted. 130
Scholarship granting organizations make private school tuition grants to
students who cannot afford private schools or to special needs students. 131
Educational improvement grant organizations provide grants to public schools
to develop innovative or advanced academic programs outside of the normal
curriculum or early childhood educational programming. 132
10. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania provides a tax credit to business entities for seventy-five percent
of the amount contributed to a scholarship organization or educational
improvement organization, capped annually at $750,000 per business entity. 133
The percentage increases to ninety percent if the business entity commits to
contributing the same amount for two consecutive years. 134 Pennsylvania also
provides a one hundred percent tax credit to business entities for the first $10,000
contributed to pre-kindergarten scholarship organizations and ninety percent of
the remaining contributions, capped annually at $200,000 per business entity. 135

125. Id. § 2357.206(C)(2) (West Supp. 2012). Other limits still apply even to the increased
percentage. Id.
126. Id. § 2357.206(J) (West Supp. 2012).
127. Id. § 2367.206(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 2012).
128. Id. § 2367.206(C)(3)(a) (West Supp. 2012).
129. Id. § 2367.206(G)(2)(c) (West Supp. 2012).
130. Id. § 2367.206(H)(1) (West Supp. 2012).
131. Id. § 2357.206(F)(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2012).
132. Id. § 2357.206(F)(12), (14) (West Supp. 2012).
133. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8705-F(a) (West Supp. 2013).
134. Id. § 8705-F(b) (West Supp. 2013).
135. Id. § 8705-F(c) (West Supp. 2013).
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The total amount of tax credits that can be awarded is capped statewide at $100
million. 136 Unused tax credits cannot be carried forward. 137
Educational improvement organizations make grants to public schools for the
development of innovative or advanced educational programs that are not part
of the traditional curriculum. 138 For example, pre-kindergarten scholarship
organizations make grants to pre-kindergarten-aged children for tuition at
schools that offer pre-kindergarten programs. 139 Scholarship organizations
make grants to eligible students, including disabled students, for tuition at any
school in Pennsylvania. 140 Pennsylvania has also allocated an additional $50
million for a similar tax credit for contributions to a scholarship organization
that provides scholarships to financially deserving students and to students in
low-achieving school districts to attend private schools, in an effort to remove
students from schools that fail to achieve sufficiently positive educational
outcomes. 141
11. Rhode Island
Rhode Island allows a tax credit for seventy-five percent of the amount a
business entity contributes to a scholarship organization, and a ninety percent
credit if the business entity commits to contribute at least eighty percent of the
first year’s donation for a second consecutive year. 142 A business entity cannot
receive more than $100,000 credits annually, and unused credits cannot be
carried forward. 143 Credits are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and
there is a statewide aggregate cap of $1.5 million per fiscal year. 144 Scholarship
organizations provide private school tuition grants to elementary or secondary
school students who may otherwise struggle to afford private school. 145
Scholarships cannot be directed to only one specific school. 146

136. Id. § 8706-F(a) (West Supp. 2013). At least $60 million must be applied to tax credits for
contributions to scholarship organizations ($8,000,000 of which can be dedicated to
pre-kindergarten scholarship programs), and at least $30 million must be applied to tax credits for
contributions to educational improvement organizations. Id.
137. Id. § 8706-F(d) (West Supp. 2013).
138. Id. § 8702-F (West Supp. 2013).
139. Id.
140. Id. The grant program is discontinued once the student graduates from high school. See
id.
141. See id. §§ 8701-G.1–8712-G.1 (West Supp. 2013).
142. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-62-1, -4 (2010). The ninety percent credit is available even if the
second year’s contribution falls below the first year’s contribution, so long as the second year’s
contribution is at least eighty percent of the amount of the first year’s contribution. Id.
§ 44-62-4(e)(3).
143. Id. § 44-62-5 (2010).
144. Id. § 44-62-3(b) (2010).
145. Id. § 44-62-2 (2010).
146. Id. § 44-62-2(7).
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12. South Carolina
South Carolina recently enacted a more limited school scholarship
organization program. The program took effect in January 2014 and permits
individuals and corporate entities to claim nonrefundable tax credits for up to
sixty percent of their total tax liability. 147 Taxpayers may not designate specific
schools or children as the beneficiaries of their contributions. 148 Credits are
awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, with a statewide cap of $8 million
annually. 149
The scholarship funding organization may award grants of the lesser of the
total tuition cost or $10,000 for expenses related to enrolling “exceptional needs”
students in private schools. 150 A scholarship funding organization is not
permitted to make grants for the benefit of a single school. 151
13. Virginia
Virginia provides a credit against various types of taxes for contributions
made to a scholarship foundation. 152 The state will credit sixty-five percent of
the total donation made to a scholarship foundation, so long as the donation
exceeds $500. 153 Credits are only awarded for the first $125,000 in donations
per individual in a taxable year, but credits are unlimited for business entities. 154
Credits are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and there is a statewide
cap of $25 million. 155 Unused credits can be carried forward for five years. 156
The scholarship foundations make awards to students who would otherwise
struggle to afford private schooling or to disabled students. 157 Scholarship
foundations cannot limit awards to students of only one school. 158
B. Evaluation of School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs
1. Arguments Opposing School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs
One argument against school scholarship organization credits is that they
generally are not implemented with corresponding accountability regulations on
147. H. 3710, § 1.85, 120th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2013).
148. Id. § 1.85(B)(2).
149. Id. § 1.85(D)(1).
150. Id. § 1.85(D)(1)(c).
151. Id. § 1.85(A)(7)(d).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.26(A) (2013) (providing credits against the individual income
tax, corporate income tax, bank franchise tax, insurance license tax, and license tax on certain
utilities).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 58-1-439-26(B) (2013).
156. Id. § 58-1-439-26(B)(2).
157. Id. § 58-1-439.28(C) (2013).
158. Id.
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private schools. 159 One area that is often left unregulated is the tuition private
schools may charge. Because scholarship organization credits seek to make
private education more affordable, private schools likely consider the
scholarships when setting tuition. 160 Tuition is thus artificially higher than it
would otherwise be; the scholarship simply provides a state subsidy to private
schools without making them more affordable. 161
Accountability within the credit program itself is another concern. 162 Direct,
public educational expenditures are typically subject to yearly reviews for
reauthorization and re-appropriation of funds, which forces a regular evaluation
of the return on the investment. 163 On the other hand, tax credits often receive
minimal review after they are enacted and therefore do not benefit from regular
inspections of their progress and effectiveness. 164
Opponents of school scholarship organization credits also attack them on tax
policy grounds. Some commentators argue that using credits to encourage
quality education potentially violates principles of vertical and horizontal
equity. 165 Horizontal equity is weakened because similarly situated taxpayers
are not necessarily taxed equally, and vertical equity is weakened because lowerincome taxpayers may not have the means to take full advantage of the tax
credits in the same manner as higher-earning taxpayers. 166
School scholarship organization credit programs are also criticized for
furthering the inequities based on income, race, and disability that already exist
between public and private schools. 167 Rather than improving the public
educational system as a whole, these tax credits merely increase public funding
of private schools in a manner that is more palatable to the public than direct
government expenditures. 168 Furthermore, minority groups are disadvantaged
159. Robinson, supra note 57, at 254.
160. Frey & Hogben, supra note 42, at 184–85.
161. See id.
162. Robinson, supra note 57, at 259–60.
163. Id. at 259.
164. Id. (“Random audits will not provide a valid picture of the quality of education or student
achievement. The use of tax expenditures rather than a direct program yields a patchy record as
opposed to a comprehensive, qualitative review for education policy decisions.”).
165. Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113.
166. Id. at 113–14; see also Deborah Katz Levi, Comment, Tuition Tax Credit Proposals in
Utah—Their Constitutionality and Feasibility, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1047, 1075 (2005) (reporting
that the primary beneficiaries of many of these credits—both in terms of the ability to take the tax
credit and in receiving scholarships from the organizations—tend to be high-income individuals
whose dependents are already enrolled in private schools).
167. Robinson, supra note 57, at 262.
168. Id. at 263–64 (“The coupling of public education extracurricular expenses with credits for
private school costs is a rhetorical, political flourish. After-school music lessons, a computer at
home, or even tutoring can enhance educational achievement, but they are not tantamount to
systemic reforms. Extracurricular activities are meant to enhance the regular school day, and do
not address significant reform issues. . . .”). This effect is particularly noticeable in states like
Arizona that have provided more significant tax incentives to encourage enrollment in private
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because, even with the credits, access to private schools remains income
dependent and thus favors white families. 169 Additionally, students with
disabilities frequently cannot take advantage of credit programs because private
schools often do not have the resources or expertise to effectively educate
severely disabled students. 170 Finally, providing incentives for students to attend
private schools may cause the best students to leave the public school system,
which exacerbates the overall decline in quality of public schools. 171
2. Arguments Favoring School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs
Some of the arguments in favor of school scholarship organization credit
programs are similar to those in favor of voucher programs. For example, some
argue that school scholarship credit programs can improve educational quality
by forcing public and private schools to compete for tax credit dollars. 172 Public
schools will also be forced to improve to prevent parents from seeking out
scholarships to send their children to private schools. 173 Another argument in
favor of credit programs that resembles arguments for voucher programs is that
the credits mitigate the “double taxation” problem, whereby parents pay for
private school tuition while simultaneously supporting public schools through
property tax payments. 174
Proponents of school scholarship organization credit programs also argue that
credit programs are superior to voucher programs because they are often
designed to reach a more economically diverse group of students. 175 While
voucher programs are usually structured to benefit only low-income students,

schools than the ones that they provide to encourage contributions to public educational programs.
See id. at 263.
169. See id. at 263 (commenting on the relationship between income, race, and private
education).
170. Id. at 264.
171. Garnett, supra note 43, at 221.
172. See MATTHEW LADNER, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, FLORIDA’S LESSONS
FOR INDIANA K-12 REFORM 13 (2009), available at http://www.edchoice.org/CMSModules
/EdChoice/FileLibrary/387/IN%20v.%20Fl%20study%200909_red%20and%20blue.pdf; David
Figlio & Cassandra M.D. Hart, Does Competition Improve Public Schools, EDUC. NEXT, Winter
2011, at 74, 80 (“[T]he increased competitive pressure public schools faced following the
introduction of Florida’s Tax Credit Scholarship Program led to general improvements in their
performance. . . . The gains occur immediately . . . implying that competitive threats are
responsible for at least some of the estimated effects.”); Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113; see also
generally GREG FORSTER & CHRISTIAN D’ANDREA, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, AN
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM (2009),
available
at
http://www.edchoice.org/CMSModules/EdChoice/FileLibrary/383/FL%20Poll
%200709.pdf (detailing the impact of the Florida credit program on the quality of both public and
private education).
173. See Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113 (“Tax credits will empower parents to penalize schools
that are performing below par and force them to become competitive or fail.”).
174. Id.
175. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 216.
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school scholarship organization credit programs are frequently designed either
without income limitations or with limitations that still allow middle-class
families to participate. 176 By diversifying the pool of potential recipients, school
scholarship organizations pressure schools to tailor their management and
educational practices to attract as many students as possible. 177 Furthermore, by
increasing the pool of potential recipients, the credit programs inevitably
increase the pool of potential donors as well. This diversification of potential
donors helps to both support existing schools and encourage new schools to
open. 178 Finally, credit programs appear to be legally viable, as evidenced by
their successful implementation in several states. 179
3. Arguments Favoring School Scholarship Organization Credit Programs
Outweigh Arguments Opposing School Scholarship Organization Credit
Programs
If the arguments in favor of school scholarship organization credit programs
do not outweigh the arguments against them, it is difficult to argue that credit
programs are nevertheless worth pursuing as a mechanism of harnessing crowd
wisdom. 180 Fortunately, the arguments favoring school scholarship organization
credits outweigh the opposing arguments because the opposing arguments can
be discredited by careful design of credit programs.
Accountability concerns are perhaps the most easily addressed. School
scholarship credit programs already have significant regulatory oversight
provisions in place, 181 although more may be necessary to prevent fraud and
176. Id. at 216–17. This argument has only developed recently, as early critiques of school
scholarship organization credits characterized them as primarily benefitting low-income families.
See H. Lillian Omand, Note, School Choice Legislation: A Supply-Side Market Effects Analysis, 20
J.L & POL. 77, 89 (2004).
177. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 216.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 217 (arguing that this multi-state implementation “suggests that the model is
able to overcome the public choice impediments to any educational choice proposal”); supra Part
III.A. (describing the successful programs implemented by several states).
180. Although crowd wisdom is an important consideration in evaluating a policy choice, it is
difficult—although perhaps not impossible—to argue that the benefits of crowd wisdom support
adopting a policy if it would otherwise be harmful. Crowd wisdom is an important consideration,
but exaggerating its importance does not justify its use. In complex policy debates, rarely is one
factor so important as to be completely dispositive of the issue.
181. States have imposed detailed regulatory oversight requirements on school scholarship
organization credit programs, including certification requirements, reporting obligations, and, in
some instances, pre-approval of scholarship awards. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6D-9(b)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1184(D) (Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 1002.395(6)–(11) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2A-2–7 (2012); IND.
CODE ANN. § 20-51-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.11S(5)(c) (West 2011 &
Supp. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6301(B)(1)(c) (Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT § 77-G:5
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.206(F)(7) (West Supp. 2012); 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8703-F, 8704-F (West Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-62-2–3 (2010);
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.28 (2013); H. 3710, § 1.85, 120th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2013).
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abuse. 182 If necessary, legislatures or applicable regulatory state agencies can
add additional oversight measures until accountability is no longer a plausible
ground for criticizing credit programs. 183
Additionally, although horizontal and vertical equity problems cannot be
eliminated entirely, they can be mitigated. Horizontal equity problems can be
reduced if more schools, including public schools, are eligible to receive funding
from scholarship organizations. For example, both Oklahoma and Pennsylvania
provide credits for contributions to organizations that fund innovative public
school programs and to organizations that award scholarships. 184 Horizontal
equity problems can be reduced even further if scholarship organizations also
provide funding to innovative private school programs. 185 Although similarly
situated taxpayers would still not be taxed in an identical manner, 186 inequity
would be reduced because benefits would flow to both public and private school
students. Vertical equity problems can be reduced by making the tax credits
refundable, which would enable all taxpayers to take advantage of them,
regardless of income level. 187
Finally, the fear that school scholarship tax credit programs will divert badly
needed public resources and highly capable students from the public school
system is not as significant as critics may suggest. The easiest solution is to cap
the total amount of credits that can be awarded, as many states have already
done. 188 Credit programs can also be designed to provide credits for
contributions to innovative public school programs, like in Oklahoma and

182. See S. EDUC. FOUND, A FAILED EXPERIMENT: GEORGIA’S TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIPS
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 14–22 (2011), available at http://southerneducation.org/getattachment
/7d5e36c6-8976-4c86-92c5-fca74ddb3530/A-Failed-Experiment-Georgia-s-Tax-Credit-Schol(1).aspx; Omand, supra note 176, at 93 (“While no voucher program has yet to be enacted without
a strong slate of regulations on private schools, tax credit programs seem to be a much weaker
magnet for regulation.”); Ryan Gabrielson & Michelle Reese, Private School Credits Rife with
Abuse, MESA TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 2009, at A4.
183. Cf. Lindsey, supra note 67, at 115 (explaining that Wisconsin increased regulatory
oversight of a voucher program to address accountability concerns).
184. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 2357.206(B)(1), (C)(1), (F)(12), (14) (West Supp. 2012);
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8702-F (West Supp. 2013).
185. See infra Part III.C. (discussing the application of crowd wisdom principles to encourage
private schools to create better educational programs).
186. Differences could arise based on the taxpayer’s decision to contribute to a school
scholarship organization or based on the school the student attends.
187. See Omand, supra note 176, at 87 (explaining that refundable credits can solve vertical
equity problems, but noting that the solution is not perfect because “refundable tax credits are really
vouchers with a different administrative mechanism”). Making the credit refundable would require
changing many current programs because most states have opted for carry-forwards of unused
credits rather than refundable credits. See supra Part III.A. Phase-outs of the credit at higher
income levels could also reduce vertical equity concerns, but this would reduce the crowd wisdom
benefits. See Lindsey, supra note 67, at 113–14.
188. See supra Part II.A. (describing various state credit programs).
FOR
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Pennsylvania. 189 Of course, including public schools in scholarship credit
programs does not guarantee that taxpayers will contribute to public schools to
the same degree that they contribute to private schools. Nevertheless, fewer
public resources are diverted from public schools under these programs than one
may think, in large part because the programs often grant credits against state
income taxes and public schools are typically funded by local property taxes. 190
Furthermore, property tax revenues comprise a smaller portion of overall public
school funding today than in the past, primarily because of desegregation efforts
and judicial decisions regarding funding equity. 191 Finally, any negative effects
arising from a decrease in school funding may be offset by a corresponding
decrease in enrollment. 192 A decrease in enrollment, particularly if it comprises
mostly high-achieving students, cannot be blamed entirely on the increased
availability of private schools. In the absence of affordable private education in
cities, families of high-achieving students are unlikely to live in cities in the first
place. 193
C. A Proposed Structure for School Scholarship Tax Credit Programs to
Maximize Crowd Wisdom
Because the arguments in favor of school scholarship organization tax credits
generally outweigh the arguments against them, it is worth considering whether
they are also a viable way of using crowd wisdom to improve educational
quality. Although some states have come closer than others in creating a credit
that could effectively harness crowd wisdom, it is unlikely that any state has
designed its credit program with this goal in mind. Therefore, the programs’
design must be modified in order to benefit from crowd wisdom. School
scholarship organization tax credits designed to tap into crowd wisdom must be
modeled to manipulate the pool of people claiming the credits—the “crowd”—
to satisfy each of the four characteristics of a wise crowd. 194 Furthermore, to
use crowd wisdom to justify the use of school scholarship organization tax
credits, the programs must be structured to ensure that the crowd is wiser than it
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the structure of the Oklahoma and
Pennsylvania credit programs).
190. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 219–20 (noting that the resource diversion argument would
be more powerful if school scholarship organization tax credits were extended at the local level and
taken against property taxes). Of course, the argument can be made that, because public schools
are often funded primarily by property taxes, credits against state income taxes reduce resources
available for non-educational government services. See Omand, supra note 176, at 87.
191. Garnett, supra note 43, at 220 (arguing that any decrease in tax revenue would likely be
felt more by city governments than public schools because school districts are often separate entities
for tax purposes).
192. See id.
193. Id. at 221.
194. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 2, at 10 (listing the four characteristics of a wise crowd: (1)
diversity, (2) independence, (3) decentralization, and (4) aggregation); see also supra Part I
(describing the four requirements).
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would be if it expressed its preferences through balloting or another existing tax
incentive, such as charitable deductions.
1. Diversity
In order to maximize diversity, a school scholarship organization tax credit
should be designed to maximize both the number of taxpayers eligible to claim
the credit and the number of activities that qualify a taxpayer to claim the credit.
Maximizing the number of eligible taxpayers is relatively straightforward. The
credit should be a refundable, so that taxpayers at all income levels can claim it
if they engage in a qualifying activity. In this sense, refundable credits are
superior charitable deductions because charitable deductions are not available to
all taxpayers. Additionally, both corporate and individual taxpayers should be
permitted to claim the credits in order to further expand the crowd. In states that
do not impose either individual or corporate income taxes, the credit could be
applied against sales taxes or property taxes. 195 Capping the amount of tax
credits that can be awarded is not ideal from a diversity perspective because such
a cap closes the crowd to new members once the caps are reached. Nevertheless,
state fiscal realities and the concern that unlimited credits would distort taxpayer
behavior likely necessitate caps in some form. 196
School scholarship organization credits should be designed to allow the
organizations to make awards to a variety of individuals and organizations to
maximize the number of qualifying activities. This will provide a wider array
of choices to the crowd than would typically be available at the ballot box.
Organizations should also be permitted to make awards to assist individual
students in attending the schools of their choice, regardless of whether the
schools are public or private. Some school scholarship organization credit
programs already authorize this type of award. 197 Enabling students to attend
schools of their choice incentivizes the crowd to contribute to organizations that
send students to schools that the crowd perceives as achieving better educational
outcomes. However, awarding scholarships to individual students does not
alone sufficiently maximize the choices available to the crowd. For example,
although individual scholarships make both public and private schools viable
choices for the crowd, they also cause schools to focus on competing for students
rather than on competing with each other systematically to create more
educational options for the crowd to consider. This leaves a significant gap in
the range of options available to the crowd.

195. See Garnett, supra note 43, at 220. Even though property tax credits would likely need
to be handled at the city or municipal level, it would not be overly difficult to design a city or
municipal tax credit that would be similar to the types of credits that exist at the state level.
196. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 409–11.
197. See supra Part II.A (noting that Alabama, Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania
allow for individual awards).
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To further increase the number of qualifying activities, organizations should
be permitted to make direct awards to both public and private schools. 198
Oklahoma and Pennsylvania are good models for this type of program. Both
states grant credits for contributions to school scholarship organizations, which
make awards to students as well as to educational improvement organizations,
which in turn fund innovative public school programs. 199 This is an excellent
step toward maximizing diversity, but it should be expanded to allow awards for
innovative programs in all types of schools, including public, private, religious,
and secular schools. 200 Including religious schools is inevitably controversial
because of the potential Establishment Clause and Blaine Amendment issues.
However, including religious schools is unlikely to invalidate the programs
because the transfer of public funds is much more indirect than in voucher
programs. 201 Moreover, including religious schools is critical to maximizing the
range of options available to the crowd. If private schools must be incentivized
to develop innovative programs to attract the resources of the crowd, religious
schools must be eligible to receive awards because many private schools are
religious. 202
2. Independence
School scholarship organization tax credit programs also satisfy the
independence requirement of a wise crowd. Admittedly, there are no discernible
advantages from an independence perspective to these programs over other
mechanisms of enhancing crowd wisdom. Nevertheless, school scholarship
organization programs promote independence because taxpayers generally make

198. In addition to increasing the number of qualifying activities, allowing direct contributions
to schools to fund innovative programs could increase the pool of potential donors by attracting
taxpayers who are not interested in funding individual student scholarships, but who are interested
in funding unique educational programs.
199. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the structure of the Oklahoma and
Pennsylvania credit programs).
200. Making awards available to public, private, religious, and secular schools under the same
criteria is arguably preferable from a constitutional standpoint to providing significantly more
incentives for awards to students to attend private schools, are often religious. See Frey & Hogben,
supra note 42, at 187–89 (comparing Pennsylvania’s program with Arizona’s and arguing that
Pennsylvania’s inclusion of public schools reduces the potential for successful constitutional
challenges).
201. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (comparing the constitutional validity of
credit programs and voucher programs).
202. See STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS & NANCY L. SWAIN,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013316.pdf (reporting that eighty-six percent of private
schools were religiously affiliated as of July 2013). The majority of private schools are religiously
affiliated because “public schools offer a nonreligious education for free, and nonreligious private
schools have a difficult time competing with that. Religious private schools offer something the
public schools cannot offer, which is why there are so many of them. . . . In effect, to exclude
religious schools is to eliminate most choice.” Moe, supra note 44, at 577.
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their choices privately, without knowledge of other taxpayers’ choices. 203 Even
if tax credit programs do not increase independence, they are an overall superior
choice for harnessing crowd wisdom they satisfy and bolster the other elements
of a wise crowd.
3. Decentralization
School scholarship tax credit programs also vastly enhance decentralization.
Tax credit programs are better suited to directing resources to solve educational
problems at a local and regional level than a centralized allocation of resources
at the national, state, or even municipal level. Because tax credit programs are
ideally structured as state or local tax credits (as opposed to federal credits), they
provide an opportunity for states to incentivize their taxpaying crowds to focus
their choices on options that are designed to enhance educational quality and that
ideally will address the particular educational needs of the states’ citizens.
Because scholarship organizations will be forced to compete at the state and
local levels for funds, the competing organizations that will emerge will have a
further decentralizing effect. These organizations will likely wish to attract
contributions from taxpayers who can easily be reached through inexpensive
local marketing and outreach. Accordingly, to accomplish this goal, the
organizations will likely direct taxpayer contributions to schools that meet the
educational needs of a particular region.
4. Aggregation
Finally, school scholarship organization tax credit programs have the ability
to effectively aggregate individual taxpayers’ choices for the benefit of the
crowd. However, an additional mechanism is necessary to aggregate the choices
of the school scholarship organizations. Admittedly, this is not as easy as with
other areas that benefit from crowd wisdom, like stock prices, in which the stock
market provides the aggregating mechanism. 204 One possible aggregating
mechanism involves the scholarship organizations themselves. When a
scholarship organization makes an award to support an individual an innovative
program at a particular school, it could be required to provide a written statement
to a centralized agency indicating why it made that particular award. That
agency could establish a detailed but limited set of justifications, and the
awarding organization could elect one—or several—reasons. The centralizing
agency could then track the schools that receive the most funding and, more
importantly, the reasons for which they received that funding. The agency could
203. Of course, no choice is completely private. Taxpayers may disclose their choice to each
other, or they may hear a public announcement from an organization about the number of donations
that it receives. However, this lack of perfect independence is not fatal, as many other
decision-making processes operate successfully without absolute independence. See SUROWIECKI,
supra note 2, at 91 (stating that independence does not require isolation, but rather “relative freedom
from the influence of others”).
204. See id. at 74.
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then publish a list ranking funding justifications. This list would be enormously
valuable to schools because it would give them a much better sense of the
priorities that the crowd places on particular facets of schools. 205 Although it is
an admittedly crude mechanism compared to the stock market, a centralized
agency would still provide a critical counterbalance to the credit programs’
decentralizing effects would enable credit programs to effectively harness crowd
wisdom.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although educational policy decisions involve balancing complex factors that
make finding a demonstrably correct decision difficult, crowd wisdom can be
applied to these decisions to produce better outcomes. Tax credits are a better
mechanism for harnessing crowd wisdom than the potential alternatives, such as
direct democratic action or voucher programs. Specifically, tax credits for
contributions to school scholarship organizations satisfy all of the requirements
of a wise crowd and can channel the crowd’s solutions into policy preferences
that could improve the educational system as a whole. These programs are still
in their infancy in the states that have initiated them, and the few existing
programs likely were not been explicitly designed to maximize the benefits of
crowd wisdom. Accordingly, although credit programs are a good starting point
for the discussion of how tax credits can be used to harness crowd wisdom in
educational policy, some of their characteristics should be redesigned with the
explicit goal of harnessing crowd wisdom in mind. Doing so would add a
significant benefit to a tax credit program that already effectively addresses the
problems inherent to other school choice programs. By improving educational
policy choices, the wise crowd would literally be helping its future members
become even wiser.

205. A list reporting only the schools that receive the most funding would not be nearly as
helpful. It is possible that some schools have only one or two strengths and consequently may only
attract funding from taxpayers and organizations who value those characteristics. These schools
would not be reported on a list of schools that receive the most funding. However, others may also
value those one or two characteristics, and they could be valuable to the crowd. The crowd will
only discover these schools if the agency ranks all contributions.
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